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In an earlier work (Bacharach and Lawler, 1981), we proposed a dependence approach to 
the bargaining process. Building on some of the earlier ideas in power-dependence theory 
(Emerson, 1972), we outlined a general theory of bargaining power, the central idea of which is 
that the bargaining power of a party—whether an individual, organization, or nation—is based 
on the dependence of others on that party. For example, the power of the United States over 
Japan is determined by the dependence of Japan on the United States for valued benefits; 
similarly, the power of Japan in its relationship with the U.S. is a function of the dependence of 
the U.S. on Japan for valued benefits. Within the dependence framework, the bargaining power 
of each party is determined by the OTHER’S dependence on them, not its own dependence on 
the other. 
Dependence varies according to: (1) the commitment to (i.e., value or importance of) the 
benefits at stake in the relationship; and, (2) the availability of the benefits from other parties. 
The theory assumes that there is an existing two-way flow of benefit in the relationship (i.e., an 
“exchange”), and the dimensions of dependence apply to such benefits. Thus, the dependence of 
Japan on the U.S. would be based on two conditions: how important the benefits provided by the 
United States are to Japan (i.e., the commitment” to the benefits in the terms of the theory); and 
(2) the availability of these benefits from other nations. Soybean sales to Japan would increase 
the power of the U.S. to a degree that soybeans are of considerable importance to Japan and not 
readily available (in sufficient quantities, at least) from alternative nations. 
Beginning with these simple notions, we have made a series of modifications in the 
theory. First, we treat dependence (and, hence, bargaining power) as nonzero sum in character. 
That is, our framework allows for the possibility that both parties in a continuing relationship 




will increase their bargaining power, and rejects the assumption that an increase in one party’s 
power necessarily decreases the other’s power. Over time, the bargaining power of both parties 
may also change in the same direction (increase or decrease). Therefore, the total power in the 
relationship is not constant; it can vary. Second, our framework stresses the tactical aspects of 
the bargaining process. That is, our purpose is to develop a framework for understanding how 
parties translate structural or environmental conditions into tactical action and how this tactical 
action affects the power relationship in the long run. The tactics of primary concern to us are 
those that modify the power dependence relationship. 
The central ideas of dependence theory are obviously not new. In one form or another, 
they are a common part of public debate on foreign policy. They can also be found in the social 
psychology (Rubin and Brown, 1975; Pruitt, 1981) and collective bargaining (Chamberlain, 
1955; Walton and McKersie, 1965) literatures and can be traced to elementary economics and 
operant psychology. 
What this article (and our larger program of work) is designed to demonstrate is that 
these very simple ideas represent a particularly suitable starting point for understanding the 
power struggle between parties who regularly engage in negotiation. Specifically, in this article 
we show that the approach contains certain paradoxes regarding the acquisition and use of power 
in an ongoing bargaining relationship. The dependence framework treats the ongoing 
relationship as a power struggle in which each party tries to maneuver itself into a favorable 
power position. 
A key problem for parties in bargaining is to weigh both the short-term and long-term 
effects of tactics used in current negotiations. The paradoxes we identify essentially indicate that 
tactics with short-term, immediate benefits (producing concessions on a particular issue) often 




reduce their users’ power in the long-term. Because of this, winning in the short run may be 
associated with losing in the long run. 
 
Paradox 1: Power is Based on Giving. 
 
 
The obvious implication of dependence theory is that to gain power you must make the 
other party dependent on you. This is accomplished by providing benefits to the other (i.e., by 
giving the other something that he or she values). For example, on the most basic level, the 
power of the United States over a third-world country is contingent on what benefits the U.S. 
provides the third-world country and vice versa; the power of management over labor is 
determined by what management provides the workers and vice versa. Both actors, of course, 
want to use the benefits they provide to the other to extract more benefits in return; that is, they 
want to give the other things they themselves don’t value (but which the other highly values) and 
receive in return outcomes that they highly value. 
From the theoretical standpoint, maximization of power means that a party must increase 
the difference between what it provides the other and ^hat the other can get from alternate 
outcome sources. 
To illustrate this concept using a labor-management context, let’s simplify the 
dependence relationship and assume that there are four basic flows of benefit: (1) the benefit to 
labor from management (label this “L”); (2) the benefit to management from labor (label this 
“M”); (3) the prospective benefit to labor from alternative sources (Lalt); and (4) the prospective 
benefit to management from altenative sources (Malt). The dependence of labor on management 
is a function of the difference between the benefit received from management and that which can 
be acquired from alternative outcome sources (L-Lalt); similarly, the dependence of management 




on labor is a function of the difference between the benefit from the union and its workers versus 
alternative outcome sources (M-Malt). 
If power is based on giving, each party in a bargaining relationship has an incentive in the 
long run to provide benefit significantly above the prospective benefit from the alternative 
sources. Thus, the maximization of labor’s power implies a maximization of the difference 
between what labor provides management (M) and what management can get elsewhere (Malt). 
There are actually two ways to maximize the other party’s dependence (and hence one’s 
own power): provide benefits to the other party, or obstruct the flow of benefits that party can get 
from alternative sources. The provision of benefits is the most critical because it is clearly under 
the control of the actor. Cutting off the opponent from alternatives can be time consuming and 
costly. In the long run, this tactic is adopted by all actors in a conflict. Unions and management 
vie for control over the supply of employees and sometimes develop relationships of a formal or 
informal nature with organizations that offer alternative outcome sources to their immediate 
adversaries; likewise, nations vie for access to and influence over third-world nations. Despite 
the potential to use tactics that produce “real” changes in the other party’s alternative outcome 
sources, “giving benefits” appears to be the most readily available tactic for manipulating the 
dependence of an opponent. 
The central implication of this first paradox is that there are conditions in which “losing” 
in the short run will increase the power an actor can wield in future encounters—assuming that 
losing involves the provision of more benefits to the opponent and an increase in the difference 
between the benefits provided and those available from alternative sources. 




In this sense, accepting a poor agreement in particular negotiations may not suggest weakness in 
the next set of negotiations and beyond. For example, one might argue that the wage concessions 
by unions in recent years could enhance their power in the future (all other things being equal). 
Capitulation can be a strategic move involving the acceptance of short-term losses to reap 
longer-term benefits by enhancing the opponent’s dependence on the capitulator. 
 
Paradox 2: To Use Power Is To Lose It. 
 
 
The flip side of giving, of course, is coercion, which may entail either an increase in 
benefits taken or a decrease in benefits given to the other party. An actor has the capacity to 
withdraw benefits (or, at least, make the provision of those benefits more costly). As frequently 
suggested in the literature on power (e.g., French and Raven, 1959), the provision of benefits 
implies a threat of losing those benefits. 
However, if giving is the foundation of dependence and power, then there are serious 
limitations to the degree that one actor can coerce the other—not in the short run, but in the long 
run. A union that extracts large wage increases over time may motivate management to reduce 
labor costs via layoffs, mechanization, etc.; a nation that increases the costs of trade to its trading 
partners encourages those nations to seek similar or substitute commodities elsewhere. While 
these observations are obvious, the implications for the dynamics of power are not necessarily so 
obvious: By using power to achieve short-term goals, a party often undermines its ability to 
extract substantial concessions in future negotiations. 
The impact of the two forms of coercion—a reduction of benefits provided to the other 
and an increase in the benefits taken from the other—can be clarified with the simplified 
formulation used in the last section. The coercive capability of labor is the equivalent of 
management’s dependence on labor (i.e., M-Malt); and, conversely, the coercive capability of 




management is essentially the dependence of the union on management (L-Lalt). The use of 
coercion by labor involves either a reduction in M (the benefits provided to management) or an 
increase in L (the benefits taken from management). Both involve a reduction in the benefit the 
other party receives from the relationship. 
Using this conceptualization, consider the impact of the use of coercion—via the 
withdrawal of benefits or an increase in “taking”—on the power relationship. First, if labor 
reduces the benefits to management (M) in contract negotiations, then labor’s power decreases 
because the dependence of management on the union declines (i.e., the difference between M 
and Malt). Second, if labor increases the amount of benefit taken from management, there is an 
increase in labor’s dependence on management and, hence, an increase in management’s power. 
Both methods of coercion actually undermine the power position of labor over time (assuming, 
of course, that the alternative outcome sources are constant). Thus, the dependence framework 
suggests that coercion that persists over time will decrease the power of the coercer; in other 
words, to use power is to lose it. 
The most extreme scenario is that labor reduces M to the point that it is equal to or less 
than Malt. This would destroy the relationship between management and labor because labor can 
use coercion only to the extent that the benefit to management exceeds the prospective benefit 
from alternative outcome sources. A union that extracts benefits from management that also 
result in plant closings and massive layoffs may have failed to consider the long-term 
implications of coercive tactics used in particular contract negotiations. By the same token, an 
organization subject to substantial losses due to theft, damaged products, absenteeism, and 
turnover may have misperceived the consequences of forcing a poor agreement on workers in 




previous negotiations. The development and maintenance of harmonious relations may require 
high mutual dependence that is perceived as such by both parties. 
Our analysis of the paradox “to use power is to lose it” warrants a caveat. While this is a 
defensible theoretical implication of dependence theory, it is not an inevitable consequence of 
using power. First, the term “use of power” in this context refers to coercive action (i.e., reducing 
the other’s benefits or increasing the benefits taken from the other). Second, in order for use to 
lead to a deterioration of the user’s power position, we must assume that there is no change in the 
prospective benefits from alternative parties. Third, environmental changes (e.g., in government 
regulations, the economy, etc.) may counteract the impact of power use on a party’s future power 
position. Despite these qualifications, however, dependence theory provides a cogent explanation 
for the counterproductive consequences of coercion over time in a power relationship. 
 
Paradox 3: Tactical Manipulation of the Power Relationship May Have Integrative Rather 
than Disintegrative Effects on the Bargaining Relationship. 
 
Efforts to change a power relationship are often met with hostility—or at least this is 
thought to be the case. Tactics designed to change the power relationship are tantamount to an 
effort to modify the terms on which an existing relationship rests. Thus it is not surprising that 
such actions are often thought to have a negative or disintegrative effect on the relationship. The 
dependence framework, however, suggests that such tactical action—even though based on 
competitive, self-interested goals—will often have an integrative or harmonizing effect on the 
bargaining relationship over time. 
Using the dependence framework, there are two broad types of tactical options available 
for actors who want to modify the power relationship: (1) tactics that increase the opponent’s 
dependence; and (2) tactics that decrease the party’s dependence. Each category can subsume a 




wide variety of specific actions, but the relative emphasis each party places on categories is most 
important to our discussion. 
In its relationship with Japan, for instance, the U.S. might place primary emphasis on 
increasing Japan’s dependence on the U.S. or on decreasing its own dependence on Japan. The 
choice made or emphasis adopted by the U.S., in conjunction with the choice of Japan, will 
determine the long-term effects of the tactical action on the power relationship. Specifically, the 
conjoint emphasis of parties determines whether the power struggle over time will have 
integrative or disintegrative effects on the bargaining relationship. 
When a party engages in action that falls into one of these categories, opposing parties respond 
with tactical action that also fits into one of the two categories. Two types of responses are 
possible: blockage and matching (Bacharach and Lawler, 1981). 
A blockage tactic attempts to forestall or prevent the action taken by the opponent. If 
successful, blockage tactics maintain the existing power relationship. A matching tactic 
reciprocates the tactical action of the actor which, in terms of dependence theory, means that the 
tactic falls into the same broad category adopted by the actor. For example, a union adopting 
tactics that increase management’s dependence on the union might be confronted with 
management actions that reciprocate by increasing the union’s dependence on the organization. 
The key to understanding the integrative and disintegrative consequences of a power struggle is 
to be found in the nature of the tactical-countertactical patterns. 































The nature of the tactic-countertactic patterns and the effect of these patterns on the 
power relationship is presented abstractly in Table 1. If Party A increases B’s dependence and 
Party B responds with action that decreases its dependence (to a comparable degree), there is no 
change in the mutual dependence or total power in the relationship. If Party A decreases its 
dependence on Party B and Party B matches this action—that is, B also reduces its 
dependence—there is a decrease in the mutual dependence. Finally, if Party A increases Party 
B’s dependence on A and Party B matches this action by increasing A’s dependence on B, then 
there is an increase in the mutual dependence between the actors. These effects of tactical 
patterns on mutual dependence, of course, assume that both parties are equally effective at 
producing the changes. Different degrees of tactic success would produce shifts not only in the 
mutual dependence (i.e., “total power”) within the relationship, but also in the relative power 
position. 




It should be clear from Table 1 that the dominant tactical patterns will determine the level 
of mutual dependence in the relationship over time. If both actors stress increases in the other’s 
dependence, mutual dependence will grow as will the potential for a more cooperative, 
integrative negotiation relationship. If labor and management stress efforts to decrease their own 
dependence on the other, then mutual dependence should decline over time, along with the ease 
of reaching agreements in negotiations. Thus, some tactical action designed to achieve an 
advantage can actually lay the foundation for conflict resolution in future negotiations. 
In summary, the dependence framework conceptualizes an ongoing, longer-term 
bargaining relationship as a power struggle. Power struggles are activated and maintained by 
parties’ attempts to alter the existing power relationship. In most any conflict, efforts to change 
the power relationship are likely, and any such effort will be met with counteraction of some sort 
(Bacharach and Lawler, 1980: Chapter 7). The major thrust of dependence theory is that the 
continual manipulation and maneuvering for position that characterizes a power struggle need 
not have a negative or disintegrative effect on the bargaining relationship. Certain tactic- 
countertactic patterns will increase harmony in the relationship, even if they are motivated solely 
by self-interest. 
 
Paradox 4: An Inferior Power Position Can Provide a Tactical Advantage. 
 
 
Recall from our earlier discussion that dependence theory identifies two determinants of 
dependence: (1) the availability of alternative parties from whom the outcomes at stake might be 
obtained, and (2) the “commitment” of a party to the benefits at stake, defined as the importance 
of or value attributed to the benefits. This paradox deals only with the commitment dimension. 
The commitment dimension of dependence has contradictory implications for power and 
tactical action. Clearly, the theory stipulates that a party highly committed to the benefits at issue 




will have less power capability than a party with a lower level of commitment (Bacharach and 
Lawler, 1976, 1981). High commitment means that one party controls benefits of substantial value 
or importance to the other. 
The paradox is that high levels of commitment may also lead a party to expend more 
tactical effort to manipulate the other and, thereby, acquire the highly valued outcomes (Lawler 
and Bacharach, 1976; Bacharach and Lawler, 1981). A party with low power on the commitment 
dimension has every reason to push strongly in the bargaining; and, an opponent with lower 
commitment might be more inclined to yield to a party with higher commitment on the benefit 
issue. Thus, a party with high power in these terms may yield more than predicted by the power 
position. 
There appear to be two motives underlying the willingness of the higher power actor to 
yield under such circumstances. First, there is strong pressure by the party with lower power for 
outcomes not highly valued by the party with higher expectation (tacit or otherwise), so that the 
lower power actor will yield on other issues that are more important to the higher power actor (i.e., 
a tradeoff); secondly, by yielding, the higher power party may convey an image of benevolence 
that improves the long-term relationship—and also future power position. Overall, where parties 
have dissimilar commitments to the outcomes of the issue, the party with less power in these terms 
should be successful (all other things equal) because yielding by the party with more power is a 
low cost act that may produce long-term benefit. 
There is empirical support for the tactical-effort implications of commitment that suggests 
that the alternatives and commitment dimensions represent qualitatively distinct bases for power 
(Bacharach and Lawler, 1981: Chapter 3). While high power in terms of the alternatives available 
is clearly an advantage (and one that shows in the tactical success of the actors), high power in 




terms of commitment to the benefits is not inevitably an advantage. This paradox suggests the 
fallacy of assuming a perfect correspondence between the power relationship, tactical action, and 
bargaining outcomes and also the importance of placing the short-term aspects of bargaining in 
the context of the ongoing power struggle. 
Conclusion 
 
In most international and labor-management contexts, bargaining occurs between actors 
who have a continuing relationship that transcends the bargaining at a given point in time. While 
it is well known that the expectation of future interaction affects the bargaining process (Rubin 
and Brown, 1975; Pruitt, 1981), little effort has been made to link the bargaining process in 
particular negotiations to the larger power relationship within which parties deal with each other. 
Our perspective assumes that parties in continuing relationships will engage in relatively 
persistent efforts to enhance their own power or reduce the other’s. Successful acquisition of a 
favorable power position at one point in time does not assure its continuation, however; in fact, 
such a gain motivates the other party to devote even greater effort to modifying the power 
relationship. The nature of the power relationship is likely to fluctuate over time because of such 
tactical maneuvering. 
Dependence theory can be used to analyze the larger power struggle within which 
specific negotiations tend to occur. The paradoxes discussed in this article suggest that tactical 
action within specific negotiations can have unintended effects on the power relationship: A 
union that makes substantial concessions at one point in time increases management’s 
dependence on the union; a union that adopts coercive tactics over time may in the process 
gradually erode its power base by making alternative outcome sources (e.g., subcontracting) 
more viable for management; if both union and management stress tactical efforts to increase the 




other’s dependence, then mutual dependence will rise over time and, all other things being equal, 
relations should become more harmonious. It is the fact that dependence theory raises such 
issues and provides general answers that makes it a useful framework for analyzing the tactical 
processes of bargaining. 
The dependence framework offers a multidimensional conceptualization of power rather 
than a unidimensional one. It traces power to basic propositions about interdependence found in 
psychology, sociology and economics; it proposes a variable-sum rather than a zero sum 
treatment of power, which is critical to an understanding of power relationships that change over 
time; and, it adopts a tactical approach to bargaining. Overall, the dependence framework 
suggests a more dynamic analysis of power relationships, one that incorporates both the short 
and long-term effects of tactical action. 
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